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STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The mission and role of the Reserve Component, particularly the U.S. Army National Guard, has dramatically changed over the last decade. While the typical RC soldier fully accepts his or her responsibility as a warrior on the battlefield during a declared armed conflict, the ambiguity surrounding the increased number of peacekeeping missions, operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the mission of the RC in Homeland Security post September 11th, 2001, have generated the need to examine and define the role of the Army National Guard (ARNG).
The purpose of this paper is to address the historic role of the ARNG and to discuss the recent shift in policy surrounding the use of the RC and ARNG in last decade for international Peacekeeping Operations. It will examine the changing role of the ARNG as it relates to Homeland Security (HLS). Furthermore, it will discuss current and future ARNG force structure, and make recommendations that will assist in defining the future part the ARNG will play in the National Military Strategy and in as we enter the 21 st century.
HISTORY

TRADITIONAL ROLES
The original Reserve Component (RC), the National Guard of the United States can trace its roots back to pre-Revolutionary times when the colonists first settled the new land. The concept of the citizen soldier, however, stems from late fourth century when the Roman Empire depended on the Comitatus, a full-time regular army that was backed by the limitani, the parttime soldiers living along the frontiers and charged with defense in time of emergency. provisions of the constitution, however, were more of a compromise than a resolution. For those who wanted a standing army, a standing army was authorized but only existed if the government wished to organize it. The militia was authorized and, according to the Constitution, the Congress was to have power to:
Provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the disciplined prescribed by Congress. Gave authority to place guardsmen on active duty training status for as many as fifteen days annually. This required, however, the consent of the state's governor. 
Total Force Policy
The Total Force Policy concept was conceived and developed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970 to address several major issues stemming from the painful experience of Viet Nam, namely a lack of public support. President Johnson's Administration, mostly for political reasons, had refused to conduct any major mobilization of the RC in the war in favor of conscription. 7 In the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam, many policy makers in the Nixon administration speculated that Johnson's moratorium on the mobilization of the RC had been a major strategic mistake and also had contributed directly to the lack of American public support.
They argued that public support would have been much stronger and more resolute if America's "Citizen Soldiers" had been mobilized and deployed. 12 Over 63,000 ARNG soldiers were deployed to Iraq and participated directly in or in support of combat operations. 13 Once again, the men and women of the ARNG had proved their metal to the nation.
In the years following Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, ARNG The force composition of the ARNG is 52% combat, 17% CS, 22% CSS, and 9% 
9-11
Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 , the RC and the ARNG has been intimately involved with military operations both foreign and domestic.
Army and Air National Guard soldiers were almost immediately called to duty as a result of the attacks. New York state immediately activated over 10,000 of its 17,000 ARNG personnel in the wake of the 9-11disaster for duty in and around New York City. remaining five ARNG divisions, three would lose one organic BDE, which will be converted to non-divisional combat service support structure. A separate brigade will be "embedded" in each of these divisions as a third maneuver brigade. Two more divisions remain untouched for the moment, but have been earmarked for conversion to combat and combat support/combat service support structure in the out years should all phases of the plan be implemented. While the transition is taking place, the Guards last three separate (but echeloned) brigades would also disappear, to be organized as combat service support units. Bottom line, ADRS equates to the loss of 2 full divisions, three divisional brigades, and three separate brigades, most to be restructured as non-divisional CSS units. Many authors suggest that the RC should be used solely for PKO and other non-standard missions so that the active component is freed up to conduct and train for combat missions.
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The fact remains that the AC cannot conduct wartime operations without the RC; too many war fighting and combat support units remain within the RC and would be required for mobilization.
Therefore, it is strongly recommended that RC force structure be analyzed for combat This section will address the strategic ramifications of using RC personnel, specifically
Army National Guard soldiers, and units for the new HLS mission and discuss the potential effect on recruiting and retention. Furthermore, this section will describe the strategic implications of converting existing ARNG force structure to meet the HLS missions/needs. In summary, a viable course of action that accomplishes both missions is presented.
BACKGROUND
With the passage of the National Guard Mobilization Act of 1933, federal law was amended designating the National Guard of the United States as a component of the Army at all times that could be ordered to active service by the President whenever Congress declared a national emergency. 38 The Guards primary mission is the Federal one; it is to "maintain properly trained and equipped units, available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or other operations as needed. 39 The State mission is to "provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state laws."
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Since September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism has given the National Guard new missions and greater credibility with the active-duty military and the public. But, at the same time, it has raised serious questions about which tasks the nations largest military reserve forces should be performing, whether the guard should remain structured as a combat force or whether it should be reorganized as a HLS force, and whether states or the federal government should oversee ARNG operations. From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as posse comitatus, or otherwise for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution of the United States or by an act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section, and any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or by both such fine and imprisonment. Sec 1385: Whoever, except in such cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution of Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the law shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
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In a nutshell, this act bans the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines from participating in Arrests, searches, seizures of evidence and other police-type activity on US soil. In order for the RC and the ARNG to adopt HLS as it's primary mission and sole responsibility major force structure changes would be required, both in the RC and in the AC.
The ability of the Army to comply with the current National Military Strategy and the National Security Strategy would be jeopardized. The risks associated with such a monumental shift in paradigm may not yield the desired end state and the result may be an AC army that is not capable of executing it's primary combat mission and a RC that is marginally trained to conduct HLS missions while losing the skills needed to support the AC in the event of a conventional war or multiple Small Scale Contingencies (SSC).
Another significant factor is the potential detrimental impact to troop morale and reenlistment quotas within the ARNG. The vast majority of soldiers in the RC enlist because they are patriotic Americans who are more than willing to fight for their nation, but who are not willing to put up with prolonged activation to guard Air Force bases, Army ammunition depots, nuclear power plants, and other military and governmental facilities and infrastructure. While the nation and the RC may still be riding a wave of patriotism post 9-11, the hard reality of the situation is that RC and ARNG soldiers do not rely solely on drill pay or military income for their livelihood and for many, careers and personal hardship will force them from our formations. The strategic ramifications of mass exodus within the ARNG and the loss of trained personnel and war fighting skills will be extreme. There will be no ready bench to turn to in time of crisis; what remains will potentially be untrained tactically will most probably lack the skills and experience to be viable in the fight.
ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES
A primary advantage for using the RC for homeland defense is that the active component can then be freed up to train for and the conduct of SSC and MTW operations. The danger however, lies in the loss of combat skills and MOS proficiency by RC units and personnel.
These skills and unit readiness take years to develop but are easily perishable and not readily reacquired should multiple MTWs arise simultaneously requiring more combat strength that can be mustered by the AC.
A major disadvantage for using the RC, specifically the ARNG, for homeland defense is that a significant amount of the combat strength required to conduct SSC and more importantly, The reason men and women joined the Army or Air National Guard in the past and the reason that they will join in the future is that they are patriotic Americans who wish to serve their nation and state in some way, but they joined to defend the nation in the event of a major military contingency. It is imperative to clearly define the roles and missions that the National
Guard is expected to fulfill in support of the National Military Strategy. A concern that cannot be ignored is that the ARNG cannot be expected to be all things to all people. It is essential that With the limited number of training days available, the National Guard cannot be a full spectrum force and support their dual mission on behalf of their state and expect to be fully prepared at all times. The roles and missions for the ARNG must be clearly defined in order to allow the National Guard units to focus their training efforts to achieve levels of proficiency necessary to meet the expectations of the nation to foster an atmosphere of trust with the active component that the ARNG is capable or achieving their assigned missions.
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It is recommended that the ADRS continue as planned in TAA 03 in order to fulfill the shortfall in CS and CSS within the AC. HLS should be a secondary mission for the ARNG but should never compromise the war-fighting integrity of any unit. One CST unit should be funded per state and territory; with the primary mission of responding to and supporting local law enforcement authorities in the advent of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist attack. The ARNG should continue to augment the AC in SSC and PKO as needed. Typically, these missions are predictable and cause less disquietude to soldiers and families the others. However, the number one mission of the ARNG should be its federal one, that of the war-fighting in the event of one or more MTWs. In order for the ARNG to maintain credibility in any assigned mission, soldiers and units must be competent at the individual and collective level. Incompetence equates to irrelevance.
"Today, I declare that we are THE Army -totally integrated, with a unity of purpose -no longer the total Army, no longer the one army. We are THE ARMY…" "We will march into the 21 st Century as THE ARMY. We acknowledge our components and their unique strengths. But we are THE ARMY, and we will work to structure ourselves accordingly."
General Eric Shinseki, CSA, 22 June 1999 WORD COUNT=9,080
